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JUDGING THE NINTH AMENDMENT
SOL WACHTLER *
INTRODUCTION
T',, ninth amendment to the United States Constitution reads:
1 "[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the People."' Virtu-
ally ignored for the first two centuries of its existence, the ninth amend-
ment was catapulted into prominence in 1965 when Justice Arthur
Goldberg, concurring in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut,2 stated his belief that the right to marital privacy was a
fundamental and basic right retained by the People within the meaning
of the ninth amendment.' Scholarly debate over the meaning and pur-
pose of the ninth amendment has intensified over the past several years4
with the rise in prominence of the jurisprudence of original understand-
ing during the Reagan administration and the widespread publicity that
followed Judge Robert Bork's nomination to the Supreme Court and re-
jection by the Senate in 1987. In the midst of a highly theoretical debate,
however, the significance of the ninth amendment has become elusive.
At its most basic level, the conflict between conservative forces that have
come to be personified by Judge Bork and more traditionally liberal legal
scholars reflects mistrust of the role of the judiciary in shaping and giving
content to fundamental constitutional rights. The ninth amendment de-
bate is only the newest twist in an ongoing dialogue concerning the
proper role of the judiciary, and the extent to which judges should infuse
legal decisions with their own senses of right and wrong.
The very existence of the ninth amendment ensures that such a debate
will continue. The act of assigning meaning to the open-ended language
of this amendment requires judges to make political decisions about the
provision's scope and effect. The simplicity of the ninth amendment it-
self presents an obstacle to its application to constitutional disputes. To
give effect to the provision's obvious meaning is to sanction what many
perceive to be untrammeled judicial activism. Yet to deprive it of any
meaningful role in the protection of fundamental rights appears to violate
the founders' intent. Thus, fixing the meaning of the ninth amendment
and assigning the amendment a place in future constitutional jurispru-
dence requires judges to confront deeply held misgivings about the inde-
* Chief Judge of the State of New York.
1. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
2. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
3. See id. at 486-87.
4. For examples of recent scholarship, see Symposium on Interpreting the Ninth
Amendment, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 37 (1988).
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terminacy and the essentially undemocratic nature of the judicial
process.
Further, any decision to give content to the ninth amendment would
signal a break with more traditional, albeit often controversial, ap-
proaches to ensuring the protection of unenumerated rights. In a polit-
ical climate where the employment of substantive due process doctrine to
derive fundamental constitutional rights is attacked as illegitimate
Lochnerizing, it is probable that any attempt to use the ninth amendment
to derive such rights would give rise to the same attack. The ninth
amendment is largely aspirational and gives no meaningful guidance to
those who would use it to ensure the protection of unenumerated funda-
mental rights. Giving it substance by considering it a source of protec-
tion for such rights would break new ground and validate the sort of
judicial lawmaking that proponents of original understanding most
abhor.
This Article will consider the history of the ninth amendment and will
look at recent scholarship to identify the concerns that continue to moti-
vate those on both sides of the debate over the nature of the judicial
process. Part I will look briefly at what prompted James Madison, the
principal architect of the Bill of Rights, to create the ninth amendment.
Part II will consider the amendment's present role in the struggle be-
tween conservative and liberal legal scholars for ascendancy in law
school classrooms and the courts. Part II will also consider the implica-
tions of the debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment as it relates
to an understanding of the judicial process. Part III will conclude that
the ninth amendment is likely to remain dormant because to unleash the
untapped power of the amendment would require judges to employ their
own conceptions of fundamental rights. Such an openly subjective juris-
prudence would be anathema to conservative judges and superfluous for
liberal judges, who are accustomed to using a "penumbral" approach to
identify and protect rights that do not fall squarely within the language
of the more specific provisions of the Constitution.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE ADOPTION OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
When the United States Constitution was first drafted, it did not con-
tain a Bill of Rights.5 On September 12, 1787, Elbridge Gerry of Massa-
chusetts, seconded by George Mason of Virginia, moved for the creation
of a committee to prepare a bill of rights. This motion was, however,
5. For examinations of the history of the adoption of the ninth amendment, see
Caplan, The History and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 Va. L. Rev. 221 (1983);
Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 Va. L. Rev. 627 (1956); Kutner,
The Neglected Ninth Amendment. The "Other Rights" Retained by the People, 51 Marq.
L. Rev. 121 (1968); Moore, The Ninth Amendment-Its Origins and Meaning, 7 New
Eng. L. Rev. 215 (1972); Ringold, The History of the Enactment of the Ninth Amendment
and its Recent Development, 8 Tulsa L.J. 1 (1972); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of




The framers' failure to include a bill of rights was likely attributable at
least in part to their common political philosophy.' Educated in the
English common law and the writings of John Locke and other political
theorists, many of the founders believed that the people were the source
of all legitimate political authority and possessed fundamental personal
liberties that had their origin in the laws of nature. To eighteenth cen-
tury thinkers, the liberty of man was as much a function and reflection of
natural law as were the laws of physics.' Despite the skepticism of some
scholars,9 it is beyond serious dispute that natural law principles colored
the outlook of those who drafted the Declaration of Independence and
later the Constitution.10
In his Commentaries, Blackstone set forth the underpinnings of the
political philosophy that so influenced the framers:
the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment
of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable
laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that
mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of
friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and
primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute
rights of individuals .... which in themselves are few and simple. 1
According to Blackstone, before man entered into society, he possessed
"natural liberty," which was "a power of acting as one thinks fit, without
any restraint or control, unless by the law of nature: being a right inher-
ent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation."' 2
Man ceded a certain portion of this natural liberty when he chose to
enter into society. The sovereign was, however, only permitted to re-
strain the natural liberties of man to the extent that such restraint was
" 'necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the publick.' "13
Thus, despite the fact that man was required to surrender a portion of his
natural liberty in return for the advantages of society, man retained cer-
tain fundamental rights that were not subject to government infringe-
ment. Blackstone identified these as the rights of personal security,
6. See J. Madison, Journal of the Federal Convention 717 (E. Scott ed. 1970).
7. See generally Erler, Natural Right in the American Founding, in The American
Founding: Essays on the Formation of the Constitution 195, 196-97 (J. Barlow, L Levy
& K. Masugi eds. 1988) (discussing idea that people are the source of governmental
power).
8. H. Commager, Jefferson, Nationalism and the Enlightenment 4, 82-84 0975);
Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1127, 1132 (1987).
9. See, eg., J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust 39, 48-49 (1980) (arguing that Constitu-
tion, unlike Declaration of Independence, did not rely upon natural law principles).
10. See 5 The Founders' Constitution 395-99 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987).
11. 5 The Founders' Constitution, supra note 10, at 388 (quoting 1 William Black-





personal liberty and personal property.14
In light of their political philosophy, many of the framers believed that
the national government created by the Constitution would be a govern-
ment of specific enumerated powers, without additional implied powers
to limit or otherwise infringe upon basic and fundamental personal
rights.I5 Moreover, the national government that they envisioned was to
be superimposed upon a system that, through the operation of thirteen
separate state governments and constitutions, already protected individ-
ual rights.' 6 As a result, there was no reason for the framers to expect
that the establishment of a strong federal government would necessarily
affect the balance between governmental power and personal freedom. 7
The failure to include a bill of rights, however, became a serious obsta-
cle to ratification of the new Constitution. George Mason, a critic of the
Constitution as it emerged from the Convention, argued that "[t]here is
no Declaration of Rights; and the Laws of the general Government being
paramount to the Laws and Constitutions of the several States, the Dec-
laration of Rights in the separate States are no Security."' 8 By January
1788, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, New Jersey and Pennsylvania
had ratified the Constitution; 19 but thereafter, seven of the remaining
eight states attached proposed amendments to their acts of ratification.
Delegates to the state ratifying conventions feared the consolidation of
power in a single federal government and believed that this government
would gradually assume more and more power, either by exercising the
powers granted by the Constitution expansively or by the assumption of
state and local authority.2" The anti-federalists seized upon the omission
of a bill of rights as a reason to oppose the ratification of the Constitu-
tion. Moreover, some supporters of the new Constitution urged the in-
clusion of a bill of rights out of concern that the charter would empower
the federal government to infringe upon the natural rights and liberties of
the people.21
The arguments concerning the inclusion of a bill of rights that took
place in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention dramatically illustrate the
positions of those on both sides of the debate. On November 28, 1787,
delegate John Smilie expressed the fear that the fundamental rights of the
14. See id. at 390-94.
15. See Moore, supra note 5, at 247; Note, supra note 5, at 816.
16. Note, supra note 5, at 816.
17. Id.
18. Mason, Objections to the Constitution of Government Formed by the Convention
(1787), in 2 The Complete Anti-Federalist 11 (H. Storing ed. 1981). Mason also noted
that "[t]here is no Declaration of any kind for preserving the Liberty of the Press, the
Tryal by Jury in civil Causes; nor against the Danger of standing Armys in time of
Peace." Id. at 13.
19. See I Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal
Constitution 319-24 (J. Elliot ed. 1836).
20. See Call, Federalism and the Ninth Amendment, 64 Dick. L. Rev. 121, 125 (1960).
21. See Ringold, supra note 5, at 3-4.
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people were not secure under the new Constitution.' Concerned that
there was no protection for "rights of conscience," Smilie stated that
"[s]o loosely, so inaccurately are the powers which are enumerated in
this Constitution defined, that it will be impossible... to ascertain the
limits of authority and to declare when government has degenerated into
oppression."23 Another delegate, Robert Whitehill, noted that
it is the nature of power to seek its own augmentation, and thus the
loss of liberty is the necessary consequence of a loose or extravagant
delegation of authority. National freedom has been, and will be the
sacrifice of ambition and power, and it is our duty to employ the pres-
ent opportunity in stipulating such restrictions as are best calculated to
protect us from oppression and slavery.24
A group of delegates argued, however, that a bill of rights was an "un-
necessary instrument."2 Thomas McKean contended that because the
"whole plan of government" envisioned by the Constitution was "noth-
ing more than a bill of rights-a declaration of the people in what man-
ner they choose to be governed," there was no need for a separate bill of
rights to be attached to the Constitution.26 James Wilson argued that in
creating and approving the Constitution, "the citizens of the United
States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner
and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and
they retain the right of recalling what they part with."2 7
Moreover, Wilson argued that an enumeration of rights would be dan-
gerous because it could be construed to disparage any fundamental rights
that might be omitted:
in a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed
for the United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary,
but in my humble judgment, highly imprudent. In all societies, there
are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly enumerated.
A bill of rights annexed to a Constitution is an enumeration of the
powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not
enumerated is presumed to be given. The consequence is, that an im-
perfect enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of
the government; and the rights of the people would be rendered incom-
plete. On the other hand, an imperfect enumeration of the powers of
government reserves all implied power to the people; and by that
means the constitution becomes incomplete.... of the two it is much
safer to run the risk on the side of the constitution; for an omission in
the enumeration of the powers of government is neither so dangerous,
22. See 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 386 (M.
Jensen ed. 1976).
23. Id. at 392.
24. Id. at 393.
25. Id. at 387.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 389.
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nor important, as an omission in the enumeration of the rights of the
people.28
The federalists prevailed in the Pennsylvania convention, and arguments
in support of the inclusion of a bill of rights were rejected. On December
12, 1787, Pennsylvania ratified the Constitution.2 9 The two proponents
of a bill of rights, Smilie and Whitehill, cast their votes against
ratification.30
Wilson and McKean's arguments mirrored Alexander Hamilton's
contention in Federalist Paper Number 84 "that bills of rights are, in
their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects, abridgments of
prerogative in favour of privilege, reservations of rights not surrendered
to the prince. '3 He continued:
[i]t is evident, therefore, that according to their primitive signification,
[bills of rights] have no application to constitutions professedly
founded upon the power of the people, and executed by their immedi-
ate representatives and servants. Here, in strictness, the people surren-
der nothing; and as they retain everything, they have no need of
particular reservations.32
Like Wilson, Hamilton argued that a bill of rights was not only unneces-
sary to secure fundamental rights, but also potentially dangerous. To the
extent that a bill of rights purported to protect personal rights against
powers not granted to the federal government by the Constitution, it
"would afford a colourable pretext [for the federal government] to claim
more [powers] than were granted. For why declare that things shall not
be done which there is no power to do?"'33
New York's ratifying convention, in which Hamilton took part, ap-
proved the Constitution without condition, but, as part of its form of
ratification, included a declaration of rights "in confidence that the
amendments which shall have been proposed ... will receive an early
and mature consideration." 3 The New York form of ratification served
as a precursor to the Bill of Rights and signaled the concerns that eventu-
ally gave rise to the ninth amendment. The document also demonstrates
the natural law background of the New York delegates. According to
the New York delegates:
all power is originally vested in, and consequently derived from, the
people, and that government is instituted by them for their common
interest, protection, and security .... [T]he enjoyment of life, liberty,
28. Id. at 388.
29. See 1 J. Elliot, supra note 19, at 319-20.
30. See 2 The Documentary History of the Ratification of the Constitution 590-91
(M. Jensen, ed. 1976).
31. A. Hamilton, J. Madison & J. Jay, The Federalist or, the New Constitution 438-
39 (M. Beloff ed. 1987).
32. Id. at 439.
33. Id.




and the pursuit of happiness, are essential rights, which every govern-
ment ought to respect and preserve....
[T]he powers of government may be reassumed by the people when-
soever it shall become necessary to their happiness... [E]very power,
jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Constitution clearly
delegated to the Congress of the United States, or the departments of
the government thereof, remains to the people of the several states, or
to their respective state governments, to whom they may have granted
the same; and.., those clauses in the said Constitution, which declare
that Congress shall not have or exercise certain powers, do not imply
that Congress is entitled to any powers not given by the said Constitu-
tion; but such clauses are to be construed either as exceptions to cer-
tain specified powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution.
35
The delegates declared, among other things, that people have a right to
practice their religion freely and peaceably, a right to keep and bear
arms, a right not to be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, a right to be free from excessive bail or fines and from
cruel and unusual punishment, a right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures of their persons, papers or property, a right to a
speedy, public trial by jury in criminal matters, a right to confront wit-
nesses and a right to the assistance of counsel to prepare a defense, a
right to assemble peaceably and the right to a free press.36
Although James Madison was troubled by the public outcry for a bill
of rights, he became the chief architect of the Bill of Rights, sorting
through the various amendments suggested by the states that had ratified
the Constitution. He was not entirely opposed to a bill of rights in the-
ory; as a strong proponent of the "necessary and proper" clause, he rec-
ognized that the exercise of implied governmental authority might
infringe upon the rights of individuals.3 7 He also rejected the idea that a
federal bill of rights was unnecessary because the state constitutions ade-
quately protected against any such infringement.38
Like Hamilton, however, Madison believed that the people possessed
certain fundamental personal rights that were not compromised by the
establishment of a centralized national government. Apparently,
Madison feared that the very process of enumeration could endanger
those rights, not only because an enumeration would give rise to an im-
plication that the government had authority to infringe those rights not
enumerated, as Hamilton and Wilson had argued, but because of the im-
plication that any right that was not enumerated was not fundamental.
In Federalist Paper Number 37, Madison described the difficulties inher-
ent in translating the ideals underlying the Constitution into simple,
35. Id. at 12 (quoting 1 Debates on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 327-31
(J. Elliot ed. 1836)).
36. See id.
37. See Van Loan, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, 48 B.U.L. Rev 1, 9-10
(1968).
38. See Caplan, supra note 5, at 254.
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workable terms.3 9 Madison feared that any enumeration of the inaliena-
ble rights of man would be imperfect and incomplete and that rights not
enumerated but no less fundamental would be threatened by the failure
to memorialize them.
Out of this concern emerged the ninth amendment to the Constitution,
which was designed to prevent the denial or disparagement of fundamen-
tal rights that, for one reason or another, were not enumerated in the first
eight amendments to the Constitution. Madison acknowledged the argu-
ments against preparation of a bill of rights when he spoke in favor of
what eventually would become the ninth amendment.
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating
particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those
rights which were not placed in that enumeration; and it might follow,
by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were in-
tended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government, and
were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible argu-
ments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against. I
have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the last clause of
the fourth resolution. 
40
The wording of this clause was changed only slightly, and by the fall of
1789, both houses of Congress had approved in substance what later be-
came the ninth amendment.41
II. GIVING CONTENT TO THE NINTH AMENDMENT-WHAT ARE
THE "RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE"?
When Justice Goldberg used the ninth amendment as the basis for his
concurrence in Griswold, he touched off an avalanche of legal scholarship
concerning the significance and scope of the neglected ninth amend-
ment. 42 Several legal scholars had studied the ninth amendment in the
39. But no language is so copious as to supply words and phrases for every com-
plex idea, or so correct as not to include many, equivocally denoting different
ideas. Hence it must happen, that however accurately objects may be discrimi-
nated in themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be con-
ceived, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate, by the inaccuracy of
the terms in which it is delivered. And this unavoidable inaccuracy must be
greater or less, according to the complexity and novelty of the objects defined.
A. Hamilton, J. Madison & J. Jay, supra note 31, at 80.
40. 1 Annals of the Congress of the United States 456 (J. Gales ed. 1851).
41. See id. at 784, 796, 923.
42. See, e.g., Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, 1966
Wis. L. Rev. 979, 988-93 (examining Court's various approaches to finding constitutional
rights and the significance of Griswold); Kutner, supra note 5, at 142 ("The Ninth
Amendment not only provides a guide for judicial action but it is also an injunction upon
the legislative and the executive at both the Federal and State levels to secure the rights of
the individual by positive action."); Van Loan, supra note 37, at 47, 48 (arguing that the
ninth amendment is "undoubtedly available" to protect some unenumerated rights, but
that the standards for recognizing such rights must be given a "more concrete definition
... than did any of the justices in the Griswold majority"); Note, Ninth Amendment
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years before the Court decided Griswold,43 and the Supreme Court had
earlier considered and rejected arguments resting in part on the assertion
of rights under the ninth amendment." Justice Goldberg's use of the
amendment to support a right of marital privacy was, however,
revolutionary.
The concurrence is well known and it is not my intention to recite it
verbatim here. Rather, I propose to examine it briefly, because Justice
Goldberg's discussion of the amendment contains the seeds of the aca-
demic debate that is currently raging over the amendment. Joined by
Chief Justice Earl Warren and Justice William Brennan, Justice
Goldberg stated his thesis succinctly:
[m]y conclusion that the concept of liberty... embraces the right of
marital privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the
Constitution is supported both by numerous decisions of this Court ...
and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment [which]
reveal that the Framers ... believed that there are additional funda-
mental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist
alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first
eight constitutional amendments.4 s
No Supreme Court justice had ever looked to the ninth amendment as
the source of an unenumerated constitutional right. Justice Goldberg
considered the history of the adoption of the ninth amendment and con-
cluded that it "shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that funda-
mental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first eight
amendments and an intent that the list of rights included there not be
deemed exhaustive."'  In Justice Goldberg's view,
[t]o hold that a right so basic and fundamental and so deep-rooted in
Vindication of Unenumerated Rights, 42 Temp. L.Q. 46, 56-59 (1968) (discussing school
dress codes as a possible area for ninth amendment application).
43. See, e-g., B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth Amendment 19-26 (1955) (arguing
that ninth amendment protects natural rights); Call, supra note 20, AT 121-31 (DISCUSS-
ING ROLE OF NINTH AMENDMENT IN FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL SCHEME); Dunbar,
supra note 5, at 637 (discussing ninth amendment's adoption and Madison's "general
theme of the immunity of certain subjects from governmental interference"); Redlich, Are
There "Certain Rights ... Retained by the People'?, 37 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 787, 802-10
(1962) (interpreting ninth and tenth amendments to protect unenumerated rights); Kel-
sey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 Ind. L.J. 309, 309-23 (1936)
(arguing that ninth amendment protects against unnecessary extensions of federal gov-
ernmental powers).
44. See, eg., United Pub. Workers of America v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 95-96 (1947)
(dismissal of civil servant because of work as political party official not violative of ninth
amendment); Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 143-44 (competition from
federal agency, the Tennessee Valley Authority, did not violate the ninth amendment);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 330-31 (1936) (ninth amendment does not affect rights
expressly granted to the federal government). See generally Ringold, supra note 5, at 9-17
(discussing pre-Griswold interpretations of ninth amendment).
45. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486-488 (1965) (Goldberg, J.,
concurring).
46. Id. at 492.
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our society as the right of privacy in marriage may be infringed be-
cause that right is not guaranteed in so many words by the first eight
amendments to the Constitution is to ignore the Ninth Amendment
and to give it no effect whatsoever. Moreover, a judicial construction
that this fundamental right is not protected by the Constitution be-
cause it is not mentioned in explicit terms by one of the first eight
amendments or elsewhere in the Constitution would violate the Ninth
Amendment. 47
Justice Goldberg argued that the ninth amendment is not an independ-
ent source of fundamental, unenumerated constitutional rights. He in-
structed judges to survey the " 'traditions and [collective] conscience of
our people' ,48 in order to determine whether a given principle is so
deeply held to be deemed a fundamental right for the purposes of ninth
amendment protection. "In determining which rights are fundamental,
judges are not left at large to decide cases in light of their personal and
private notions."'49 It is difficult to understand, however, how a judge
could not be guided by his or her personal notions of right and wrong
when considering what rights should be considered fundamental and de-
serving of full constitutional protection.
Thus, to some extent, Justice Goldberg did not see the ninth amend-
ment as a source of rights but rather as a source of judicial power.
Although it is unlikely that he would have articulated his view of the
amendment in those terms, it is undoubtedly true that he envisioned that
the judiciary would be charged with giving meaning and content to the
ninth amendment. He left it up to judges to look beyond the specific
guarantees of the Bill of Rights and canvass American culture in an ef-
fort to determine what rights are fundamental and deserving of protec-
tion. A judicial failure to engage in such an inquiry would disparage
those rights not enumerated by the framers and thereby contravene their
clear intent that those rights be protected under the ninth amendment.
Justice Goldberg's sense that it is appropriate for a judge to look be-
yond the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights to secure the protection
of unenumerated rights is at the heart of the current controversy over the
proper scope of the ninth amendment. There are essentially two camps
among those scholars who have studied the ninth amendment-those
who see it as a source of protection for unenumerated fundamental
rights, and those who see it as a rule of construction that adds nothing of
substance to the rights that are protected by the Constitution. "0 It is safe
to say that the members of the latter group have a more conservative
view of the proper role of judges in the identification of fundamental
rights. They are inclined to argue that judges should not stray beyond
47. Id. at 491.
48. Id. at 493 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
49. Id.
50. See generally Soderberg, The Ninth Amendment: A Great Debate, 16 Barrister
Magazine 47, 48 (Winter 1989-90) ("[T]he Ninth Amendment at most points to other
parts of the Constitution.").
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those rights specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights. In his recent
book The Tempting of America,"' Judge Robert Bork, not surprisingly,
showed himself to be among these scholars.
Bork reasons that
it is inconceivable that men who viewed the judiciary as a relatively
insignificant branch could have devised, without even discussing the
matter, a system, known nowhere else on earth, under which judges
were given uncontrolled power to override the decisions of the demo-
cratic branches by finding authority outside the written Constitution.5 2
He concludes that the rights retained by the People are those that had
been guaranteed by the various state constitutions, statutes and common
law before the Constitution and Bill of Rights were adopted."
It is clear that the framers, as adherents to the natural law tradition,
believed that the People possessed certain fundamental personal rights
apart from those granted by the Constitution. We cannot necessarily in-
fer, however, that the framers foresaw the extent to which the judiciary
would gradually assume authority over the protection of fundamental
personal rights, or that if they did foresee it, they would necessarily con-
demn it. Because the framers believed that no branch of government
would have the power to threaten or restrict fundamental rights retained
by the People, the current controversy about the legitimacy of judicial
lawmaking and its supposed counter-majoritarian tendencies does not
necessarily serve as a guide to what the framers intended the ninth
amendment to mean. In fact, evidence that James Madison considered
the legislature to be the most dangerous branch of the government and
saw the political power of the majority as the greatest potential threat to
the rights of the People 4 makes it extremely unlikely that he ever in-
tended that the legislature have exclusive power to protect fundamental
rights.5" For that reason, today's debate cannot be resolved solely
through reference to the views of the framers. They shared a political
philosophy and a historical perspective that to us seems both dated and
limited.
The debate among modem scholars is a reaction to the enormity of the
power that the judiciary has amassed over the past two hundred years. It
51. R. Bork, The Tempting of America (1990).
52. Id. at 185.
53. Id. at 184-85.
The meaning of the ninth amendment is therefore entwined with the meaning of
the Bill of Rights as a whole, for the amendment's purpose is to preserve indi-
vidual rights that had long been protected by the states .... If natural law is
embedded in the ninth amendment, it is because at the time the ninth was
adopted natural law was an integral part of justiciable state law. Both Hamil-
ton and Madison are clear that unenumerated rights refer to the laws of the
several states, not to anterior, transcendent federal norms.
Caplan, supra note 5, at 260-61.
54. See Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 17 (1988).
55. See id. at 17-19.
1991]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
also reflects the increasingly prominent role in the articulation and pro-
tection of personal rights, some that are specifically enumerated, others
that are implied by generous readings of the first eight amendments and
the fourteenth amendment.56 Thus, Judge Bork's view of the ninth
amendment is informed by his legal and political views regarding the
need for judges to exercise restraint.
Judge Bork does not consider the political philosophy of the framers to
be dispositive in construing the amendment. If he did, he would be com-
pelled to give effect to the framers' belief in fundamental rights that exist
apart from positive law. Instead, in confronting the admittedly open-
ended language of the ninth amendment, Bork projects his own opinions
regarding the role of the judiciary onto the provision. While this is not
wrong or intellectually dishonest, it greatly diminishes the historical va-
lidity of his argument. If all that Judge Bork is able to state with cer-
tainty is that the ninth amendment should be accorded a particular
meaning because he, as a judicial conservative, cannot conceive it to have
another meaning, his view is nothing more than personal opinion. In no
way does it have the imprimatur of quasi-divine truth, which seems to be
what conservative legal thinkers seek in the theory of original under-
standing. Indeed, by proposing that the ninth amendment be given no
role as a source of fundamental rights, Bork is making the same sort of
personal, policy-based decision that he would no doubt criticize Justice
Goldberg for making. It is personal philosophy, and not history or the
language of the Constitution itself, that becomes the motivating force be-
hind this sort of debate.
But arguments of this type become troublesome when we consider
their implications for judges still on the bench considering constitutional
arguments based in whole or in part upon rights asserted under the ninth
amendment. If the ninth amendment indeed has some meaning and pur-
pose, something that its very existence would seem to indicate, its terms
would seem to control. For judges to ignore it would be an apparent
violation of the framers' express intent. 57
56. Raoul Berger acknowledged as much when he wrote
[t]he ninth amendment demonstrably was not custom-made to enlarge federal
enforcement of 'fundamental rights' in spite of state law; it was merely declara-
tory of a basic presupposition: all powers not 'positively' granted are reserved
to the people .... It is against this background that the Goldbergian resort to
the ninth amendment is to be viewed; another bit of legal legerdemain whose
purpose is to take from the people their right to self-government and put it in
the hands of the Justices.
Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 23-26 (1980).
57. For a constitutional interpreter to say, as... Judge Bork ha[s] done, that the
set of enforceable constitutional rights is limited to those specified in the text is
... precisely to defy the ninth amendment by denying that there are other rights
retained by the people and by disparaging the enterprise of searching for a mode
of analysis that might flesh out this admittedly otherwise skeletal remainder.




The very existence of the ninth amendment serves as proof that the
school of original understanding fatally misreads the purpose and role of
the Bill of Rights:
[t]he Framers were aware of the elasticity of the common law and the
changing nature of state constitutions and statutes. This broad formu-
lation of the ninth amendment was generally preferred to the suggested
approach of anti-federalists such as Patrick Henry and George Mason
who advocated incorporating the common law directly into the Consti-
tution. It was feared that incorporating the common law would freeze
it at the date of ratification of the Constitution, prohibiting its future
development and growth. The Framers recognized that the law is not
static and knew that they would not foresee every contingency that
might threaten individual rights and thus require constitutional
protection.58
The continued vitality of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights is indeed
a tribute to the delegates of the state conventions who contributed the
language that came to enshrine the principles that the first Americans
held most dear. But that vitality is threatened by an interpretive ap-
proach that would render a nullity the framers' intent to protect
unenumerated fundamental rights as fully and completely as those that
were enumerated in the first eight amendments. The framers were not so
arrogant as to presume that they were able to articulate for all time the
entire range of rights that were fundamental and guaranteed by the laws
of nature. It is for that reason that the ninth amendment, however enig-
matic, took form. The provision became a statement of the framers'
profound belief that fundamental rights were fundamental because they
were a function of the natural order and not because they were memori-
alized in the Constitution and elevated by popular consent into the law of
the land. James Madison's fear of memorializing rights was related in
part to his concerns about the limitations of language that would surface
in the course of any attempt to define and articulate the broad panoply of
rights that the American people retained after giving their consent to the
government created by the Constitution.59 Scholars who ignore this as-
pect of constitutional history favor reining in activist judges, limiting
them to reliance upon what is written and can be determined empirically.
To treat the ninth amendment as an historical anomaly that adds noth-
ing to serious constitutional jurisprudence, simply because the amend-
ment is difficult to understand, not only violates the mandate that
unenumerated rights be neither denied nor disparaged, but also ignores
the framers' intent that the Constitution be read broadly to protect fun-
damental rights. While we no longer share the framers' natural law phi-
losophy, we should not overlook the definite and profound ways in which
58. Mitchell, The Ninth Amendment and the "Jurisprudence of Original Intention,"
74 Geo. L.J. 1719, 1728 (1986) (citations omitted).




that philosophy shaped both the enumeration of certain rights in the
Constitution and the adoption of a provision expressly designed to pro-
tect fundamental unenumerated rights.
Scholars who generally support an active role for the judiciary in the
identification and articulation of unenumerated fundamental rights have
given the ninth amendment its literal meaning in light of the framers'
natural law tradition: that there are fundamental rights that exist outside
of the Constitution and that the framers believed were as deserving of
protection as those rights enumerated in the Constitution.' ° Many of
these legal scholars attempt to make the legal universe created by this
view of the ninth amendment slightly less open-ended by identifying ob-
jective sources to give content to the amendment.6
One approach has been to turn the original understanding philosophy
on its end by looking to historical evidence that the framers intended that
extratextual sources of authority be employed to aid in the interpretation
of the Constitution.62 Professor Thomas Grey, a leading advocate of this
school, "treat[s] the text as the overriding source where it speaks clearly,
but [as] supplemented by an unwritten constitution made up of principles
that underlie precedent and practice as seen from the perspective of the
present."63 Indeed, he notes, the ninth amendment and the due process
clauses themselves authorize judges to look beyond the written language
of the Constitution.'
Advocates of this approach base their views on a reading of the natural
rights tradition that informed the debates in the state ratifying conven-
tions about the need for a bill of rights. These constitutional scholars
look to the British concept of an unwritten constitution to support their
theory that the framers intended extratextual sources to be used to derive
fundamental rights deserving of constitutional stature and protection. 65
According to these scholars, the American colonists believed that the
60. With a comprehensive perspective, the courts could more easily and more
rationally discover the content of rights which are not specifically enumerated
in the Constitution but which are, nevertheless, rooted in the expectations of the
people and in documented policy. A court which uses these sorts of indicia of
'rights' content would not be acting arbitrarily, deferring to transcendental
sources, or expounding a personal social preference. On the contrary, it would
be rationally implementing social demands and expectations which are gener-
ally shared and which are empirically discernible.
Paust, Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 Cornell
L. Rev. 231, 236-37 (1975).
61. See id. at 260-66.
62. See, eg., Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 211,
221 (1988) ("The text itself authorizes resort to these unwritten sources through provi-
sions like the ninth amendment and the due process clauses."); Sherry, supra note 8, at
1156 ("The architects of our constitutional system assumed that appeals to natural law
would continue despite the existence of a written constitution.").
63. Grey, supra note 62, at 221.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 217; see also Sherry, supra note 8, at 1129 (British ideas were "tremen-
dously influential upon the generation that framed the American Constitution").
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unwritten British constitution consisted of "a mixture of custom, natural
law, religious law, enacted law, and reason" and could be invoked by
judges to invalidate Acts of Parliament.66 The belief of early American
judges in the concept of an unwritten constitution is evident from their
treatment of arguments based in whole or in part on the assertion of
unenumerated rights. Professor Sherry has examined a number of state
cases that were decided before 1787 in detail and concluded that
[t]hese cases suggest that for American judges in the late eighteenth
century, the sources of fundamental law were as open-ended as they
were in English opposition theory. The colonists inherited a tradition
that provided not only a justification for judicial review but also guide-
lines for its exercise. As Bolingbroke proposed in theory and the new
American states translated into action, judges were to look to natural
law and the inherent rights of man, as well as to the written constitution,
in determining the validity of a statute.67
Professor Sherry notes that a belief in natural law also rested at the
foundation of several early decisions of the Supreme Court, most notably
cases in which the justices were called upon to consider the rights of
individuals. 68 This philosophy, however, became increasingly subject to
criticism as the eighteenth century reliance on natural law principles de-
cined and was gradually replaced by a view of the Constitution as the
only legitimate source of fundamental law.69 Professor Grey has pointed
out, however, that while nineteenth century constitutional doctrine de-
creased its reliance upon natural law principles, nineteenth century
judges did not increasingly ground decisions in the express language of
the Constitution. On the contrary, the meaning and scope of general
clauses of the Constitution were expanded to encompass rights that
would once have been treated as natural and fundamental, though
unenumerated.7 °
This group of scholars has contributed a fascinating historical perspec-
tive to the debate over the meaning of the ninth amendment. They vali-
date what might at first glance appear to be an untenable position-that
the ninth amendment exists solely as a means for the protection of rights
that are to be derived and defined solely through extratextual sources.
Once we accept, however, that the founders intended future generations
to protect rights, there still remains the problem of identifying those
rights. This is an entirely different area of ninth amendment scholarship.
A number of commentators have attempted to list what they consider to
be fundamental rights that fall outside the scope of the first eight amend-
ments to the Constitution. Professor Bertelsman, for example, places
family rights, privacy rights, personal fulfillment rights and economic
66. Sherry, supra note 8, at 1129.
67. Id. at 1145 (emphasis added).
68. See id. at 1168-70; Grey, supra note 62, at 221.
69. See Sherry, supra note 8, at 1170; Grey, supra note 62, at 221.
70. See Grey, supra note 62, at 218.
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and property rights on a tentative list of those unenumerated rights that
could be protected by the ninth amendment.71 In his discussion of the
ninth amendment, 0. John Rogge takes an extended look at a number of
unenumerated rights that have been protected by the other eight amend-
ments of the Bill of Rights, among these the right to privacy, the right to
engage in political activity, the right to move freely, the right to obtain
knowledge, the right to confrontation in proceedings other than criminal
proceedings, the right to use the mails and the right to picket peace-
fully.7 2 Finally, Professor Paust cites to the "value matrix" proposed by
Professors McDougal and Lasswell, and lists the following as discovera-
ble and fundamental human values that deserve protection under the
ninth amendment: (1) the right to participation in the governmental pro-
cess; (2) the right to "sanctity of person" and the opportunity for per-
sonal fulfillment; (3) the right to intellectual enlightenment and the
"freedom of inquiry and opinion"; (4) the right to human dignity and
freedom from discrimination; (5) the right to access to goods and serv-
ices; (6) the right to acquire the skills needed to achieve self-fulfillment;
(7) the right to worship and to follow and communicate personal and
community values and morals; (8) the right to choose and form personal
relationships freely; (9) in sum, the right to personal security and
autonomy.73
Identification of unenumerated rights is an interesting theoretical exer-
cise, but does not take into account the jurisprudential obstacles that
stand in the way of employing the ninth amendment to protect
unenumerated fundamental rights. In order to counter the argument
that use of the ninth amendment will add to judges' already considerable
power, some commentators seek an objective source from which
unenumerated rights can be derived. For example, a number of schol-
ars74 look to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 75 which was
adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1948.
Although not officially treaty law, the Declaration is nonetheless a state-
ment of those human rights that society of considers both fundamental
and absolute. More importantly for judicial conservatives who fear that
judges will use their own conceptions of right and wrong to formulate
fundamental rights out of whole cloth, the Declaration is an accepted
source that could serve as an objective basis for the definition and deriva-
tion of fundamental rights protected by the ninth amendment. The Dec-
laration thus serves the purpose of giving content to the ninth
amendment without necessarily sanctioning a gradual expansion of judi-
cial authority in the articulation of fundamental rights.
71. See Bertelsman, The Ninth Amendment and Due Process of Law-Toward a Via-
ble Theory of Unenumerated Rights, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 777, 790-93 (1968).
72. See Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 Calif. L. Rev. 787, 799-826 (1959).
73. See Paust, supra note 60, at 263 (citing M. McDougal, Studies in World Public
Order 336-37 (1960)).
74. See Bertlesman, supra note 71, at 789; Paust, supra note 60, at 259.
75. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 3 U.N. GAOR Res. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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To some extent, then, the objections of judicial conservatives are ad-
dressed so long as there exists an objective source from which fundamen-
tal rights originate and against which constitutional arguments asserting
these rights can be measured. Yet the question remains whether the ar-
ticulation of so-called "fundamental" rights is either a proper or accepta-
ble judicial function, or whether efforts in this area would be viewed as
judicial lawmaking in its most raw and undemocratic form. I now turn
to a discussion of why ninth amendment study is tied so completely to a
search for external sources that can serve as objective bases for the deri-
vation of unenumerated rights and whether this search is either feasible
or desirable as a jurisprudential matter.
III. SHOULD JUDGES BE INVOLVED IN THE BusINESS OF
ENUMERATING FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS?
John Hart Ely, in his book Democracy and Distrust,76 examines the
open-ended provisions of the Constitution, including the ninth amend-
ment, and asks whether "a principled approach to judicial enforcement
of the Constitution's open-ended provisions [can] be developed, one that
is not hopelessly inconsistent with our nation's commitment to represen-
tative democracy."77 He then considers a variety of sources from which
fundamental rights could be derived-the judge's own values, natural
law, neutral principles, reason, tradition, consensus and predictions of
future progress. In rejecting these efforts as futile, he concludes that only
by encouraging popular participation in the processes of government can
judicial review in this area attain any measure of legitimacy."
It is not my purpose here to critique either Professor Ely's conclusions
or his methodology. In fact, it is because I agree with his succinct state-
ment of the interpretive problems posed by open-ended clauses in the
Constitution that I begin my discussion here by citing to his book. After
all the history is reviewed and political philosophy digested, the question
remains whether we want our judges to attach constitutional significance
and accord constitutional protection to rights that individual judges have
determined are fundamental. Moreover, if the answer to that question is
yes, another question demands to be answered-how can we ensure that
the judges are identifying rights that are truly fundamental and not sim-
ply exercising judicial power in such a way as to bring about their own
personal conception of the common good?
Last June, following the Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
Eichman and United States v. Haggerty," lawmakers debated whether a
constitutional amendment permitting the prosecution of individuals who
desecrated or destroyed the American flag should be added to the Consti-
76. J. Ely, supra note 9.
77. Ely, supra note 9, at 41.
78. See id. at 44-70, 73-104.
79. 110 S. Ct. 2404 (1990).
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tution. President Bush and a number of other lawmakers, including Sen-
ator Robert Dole of Kansas, spoke out in favor of the proposed
amendment.80 However, the issue threatened to become a political liabil-
ity for lawmakers who, while opposed to flag burning, questioned
whether the Constitution should be amended to restrict what the Court
had determined was protected speech under the first amendment. Ten
days after the decision was announced, the proposed amendment died on
the floor of the House of Representatives in a vote of 254 for and 177
against,"1 34 votes short of the two-thirds needed to send it on to the
Senate.
The flag burning issue remains an interesting illustration of the consid-
erations that are implicated when there is movement toward delineating
a value that is held in common by a large number of Americans and
according it constitutional protection. Amending the Constitution to
protect the flag would have achieved through political means an end that
the Court could arguably have brought about by invoking the ninth
amendment and upholding the flag burning statute as a protection of a
deeply held American value. Thus, the political aftermath of the Eich-
man decision is instructive in resolving the question of whether concern
for fundamental values should animate judicial determination of argu-
ments based upon the assertion of constitutional rights, or whether such
values are better evaluated and balanced through the political process.
It is not to engage in partisan politics to observe that support for the
flag burning amendment was an emotionally charged political issue that
became a litmus test for patriotism among members of Congress. Those
who withheld their support faced the possibility of being branded by op-
ponents as unsupportive of the flag and the values that it embodies. This
political gamesmanship is to be expected, especially where a Republican
in the White House and a Democratic majority in both houses of Con-
gress are looking forward to a number of hotly contested congressional
races in the fall. Yet the controversy demonstrates that what can argua-
bly be labelled a fundamental value-respect for the flag-can also be-
come a tool for politicians who, however sincerely they may believe that
desecration of the flag is wrong, cannot overlook the implications that
support for that fundamental value may have on the political process.
Thus, articulation and elevation of a fundamental right to constitu-
tional status is not a politically neutral act. A fundamental value such as
respect for the flag does not exist in isolation, waiting to be discovered
and identified. Rather, the value, even if held by the majority or a pow-
erful minority of Americans, means different things to different people.
Moreover, different people are not willing to sacrifice the same things to
see the value protected by the Constitution. Thus, the identification of a
80. Greenhouse, Supreme Court Voids Flag Law; Stage Set for Amendment Battle,
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
81. 136 Cong. Rec. H4087-88 (daily ed. June 22, 1990).
[Vol. 59
JUDGING THE AMENDMENT
fundamental value, even if it can legitimately be called fundamental, will
always be controversial.
Suppose that in this case the Court had indeed found that respect for
the flag was a fundamental value that was entitled to the full range of
constitutional protection under the ninth amendment. The Court would
have concluded that the flag burning statute was constitutional as a legit-
imate measure designed to further that value.8 2 Noting that a majority of
Americans cherish the flag and all that it represents, the Court might
have found that protection of the flag from desecration was a fundamen-
tal constitutional value. This result, however, would operate to limit
constitutional protections of political speech. Such a constriction of first
amendment protections would not be universally applauded, as evi-
denced by the debates that followed the Eichman decision and the move-
ment for a flag burning amendment. What opponents of the amendment
seemed to fear most was that veneration for the flag, itself unobjection-
able, was threatening to curtail freedom of speech, a value clearly ex-
pressed in the Bill of Rights and one of the values that made the flag
worth venerating. In short, treating respect for the flag as a fundamental
value deserving of constitutional protection would have required a com-
promise of rights already enshrined in constitutional jurisprudence.
Thus, what the flag burning controversy reveals is that to decide
whether to elevate one value can in certain instances require balancing
that value against another held equally dear. However clear the ninth
amendment language may be, fundamental values are not diamonds in a
mine that need only to be extracted, cut and polished for their beauty and
clarity to shine through. They do not exist in isolation; rather, they are
part of a universe in which other rights have already been catalogued and
accorded protection through an expansive reading of the first eight
amendments, as well as the fourteenth. There is always the possibility
that a right or a value cannot be fully protected without limiting another
right that has already been recognized and accorded constitutional pro-
tection. The process of identifying new rights and weighing them against
rights that are already accorded constitutional protection is fraught with
political consequences, and I question whether judges should be involved
in such an undertaking.
To some extent, then, I believe that Professor Ely has stated the ques-
tion well. We live in a democratic society and the Constitution, as the
blueprint for a representative democracy, has served us well for the past
two hundred years. Yet it is beyond dispute that this blueprint for a
democratic society contains a provision that has the potential to operate
82. I realize that legal arguments based upon the assertion of ninth amendment rights
do not usually take this form. Rather, they are raised to challenge the enactment of a law
that purportedly violates the fundamental, though unenumerated. rights of a segment of
the population. The ninth amendment has been used so infrequently and its language is
so general, however, that I can see no reason why it could not form the basis for a defen-
sive argument of the type that I propose.
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in a decidedly undemocratic way. It seems to me intellectually dishonest
to read the ninth amendment as anything but an exhortation to future
generations to look beyond the four corners of the document and seek
out the full range of rights retained by the People and entitled to consti-
tutional protection. But intellectual honesty takes me only so far. Once
I have acknowledged that the framers intended the ninth amendment to
mean what it says, I find myself in a quandary that I am unable to re-
solve. To ignore the amendment is to transgress its express language; to
give it full effect is to threaten the democratic society envisioned by the
framers.
While I believe that the judicial process is well suited to the protection
of fundamental rights and liberties,83 I also believe that given the nature
of the judicial process and of the constitutional controversies that the
Court considers, judicial lawmaking is certainly most defensible and de-
sirable when its focus is upon fundamental rights that can be discerned
from the words of the Constitution itself. The nature of the judiciary and
the judicial process, as well as principles of justiciability, legitimate the
process of judicial lawmaking by relating the decision-making process to
a defined controversy between specific parties.8 4 When constitutional
rights are asserted, judicial lawmaking remains legitimate, principally be-
cause features unique to the judicial process and the judiciary as an insti-
tution ensure that the result reached is grounded in the text of the
Constitution and takes into account the situation of the parties before the
court.85 When rights secured by specific constitutional provisions are
construed within the context of a specific case, the judicial process is well
adapted to the articulation and protection of those rights.
When rights are not referenced to specific constitutional guarantees
and articulation of those rights entails choices that are essentially polit-
ical in nature, I question whether the judiciary should become directly
involved. This is not because I doubt the ability of judges to weigh com-
peting interests, nor because I am foolish enough to believe that individ-
ual conceptions of right and wrong never motivate judges considering
arguments based upon the assertion of constitutional rights. Rather, I
believe that to give the ninth amendment its literal meaning is to sanction
a process whereby the judiciary is empowered not only to determine
what rights could conceivably be retained by the People, but also to
weigh the protection of those unenumerated rights against rights that
have already been accorded constitutional protection through an expan-
sive reading of other amendments of the Constitution. This process, as I
have noted earlier, will often be controversial. I believe that the unique
features of the judiciary-its independence, its traditional mode of analy-
sis and explication-do not necessarily legitimate a judicial role in the
articulation and protection of rights that are not in any way grounded in
83. See Wachtler, Judicial Lawmaking, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 19 (1990).
84. See id. at 16-20.
85. See id. at 18-20.
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the explicit language of other rights-bearing provisions of the Constitu-
tion. A decision whether to protect unenumerated rights at the expense
of enumerated rights is often a function better left for the political
process.
I have no doubt that the founders intended that the Constitution, a
compact among the thirteen original states, achieve timelessness through
its ability to weather social and political change with its core principles
and ideals intact and indeed strengthened. Certainly, they had no idea of
the range of technological and social changes that would follow the
founding of the American republic. If they had been blessed with such
prescience, I am not sure that they would have agreed on a reading of the
Constitution that could reconcile their vision with the demands of future
generations. I believe, however, that the ninth amendment, however
clear its language, cannot be given an expansive reading that would es-
sentially sanction judicial authority to resolve disputes that are probably
better left for the political process.
Indeed, judicial protection of fundamental rights under the ninth
amendment is likely superfluous in modem constitutional jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court, through a generous reading of the first eight and the
fourteenth amendments, has ensured the continued vitality of the Consti-
tution and the continued protection of personal rights. The Supreme
Court's use of a substantive due process analysis to protect rights that are
not explicitly enumerated in the Constitution has been attacked by judi-
cial conservatives.86 The assertion and protection of rights in this man-
ner has, however, become an accepted aspect of constitutional
jurisprudence that will likely continue to lead to a broad protection of
unenumerated rights-a process that the founders clearly intended to en-
courage when they drafted the ninth amendment. Although public per-
ception is not dispositive in determining whether the judiciary is
operating within the scope of its authority, any assertion of essentially
limitless judicial authority to discover rights entirely through construc-
tion of extratextual sources would open the judiciary to widespread criti-
cism. Given the intent of the framers and the language of the ninth
amendment, this criticism might not be warranted. It would, however,
surely follow any effort to revive the ninth amendment to protect per-
sonal rights.
In the final analysis, the ninth amendment best serves as a reminder
that the framers did not intend that the Constitution be a static docu-
ment and that rights asserted by the People against the government be
limited by the express language of the first eight amendments.8 " The
framers believed that the People had broad personal rights that no gov-
ernment could take away. The first eight amendments were not an ex-
haustive expression of those rights, and the ninth amendment was
86. See Bork, supra note 50, at 31.
87. See Arnold, Doing More Than Remembering the Ninth Amendment, 64 Chi.-Kent
L. Rev. 265, 265-68 (1988).
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adopted to ensure that a failure to enumerate fundamental rights would
not prove fatal to other rights retained by the People. The Constitution
also created a representative democracy, carefully crafted to avoid the
concentration of power in any one branch of the government. Whatever
the strengths and unique attributes of the judiciary, I do not believe that
this institution should engage in decision-making that is essentially polit-
ical in nature. Where rights are given content and protection through
the use of a provision that exhorts without giving either guidance or di-
rection, I believe that the line between legitimate and illegitimate judicial
lawmaking is crossed.
CONCLUSION
The ninth amendment was adopted to ensure that unenumerated
rights would be protected. While to use this amendment as a means of
identifying and elevating certain "fundamental rights" to constitutional
protection would be a mistake, I believe that the amendment nonetheless
should be considered as a testament to the intent of the founders that the
Constitution be read broadly to protect a wide range of personal rights.
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